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We investigated the effectiveness of a security risk management (SRM) program at a large healthcare institution. 
Using a survey, we explored how nine critical success factors (CSFs): executive management support (EMS), 
organizational maturity (OM), open communication (OC), risk management stakeholders (RMS), team member 
empowerment (TME), holistic view for an organization (HVO), security maintenance (SM), corporate security 
strategy (CSS), and human resource development (HRD) impacted SRM effectiveness. Implementing a mixed 
research method, we found that employees had a positive perception of SRM toward all CSFs but one―team 
member empowerment (TME). Both medical professionals and staff had a negative perception of how TME was 
implemented at the institution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Effective security risk management (SRM) programs in organizations can help balance operational necessities and 
economic costs associated with information technology (IT)-based systems. SRM is a series of mechanisms that 
have been put in place by an organization to counter or prevent an information security-related event [Blakley, 
McDermott, and Geer, 2001]. Some of these mechanisms entail risk assessments, information security policies, and 
secure computing practice in an organization [Spears and Barki, 2010]. 
 
The overall objective of SRM is to enable an organization to adequately handle information. According to Dhillon 
[2007], SRM is not a standalone activity; it should be integrated with all processes of an organization. This could 
include understanding potential threats, educating personnel in security awareness, and establishing and executing 
security policies. Since a SRM program is an enterprise-level implementation with multiple stakeholders (employees, 
contractors etc.), it is imperative for organizations to establish effective SRM policies and practices. Since 
employees are the users who interact with information systems on a regular basis in their business activities, the 
way they use the systems and whether they follow the established guidelines can ultimately influence the overall 
security of the organization. Considering the overarching impact, it is surprising that organizational-level studies that 
consider SRM in the context of healthcare industry are currently lacking in IS research. Security risk is inherent in 
the delivery of healthcare, and it continues to increase due to a rise in direct (network) and indirect (media) 
connectivity. 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore a SRM program in-depth at the organization level by addressing the research 
question: What is the perceived effectiveness of an existing security risk management program at a large healthcare 
institution? Since employees at different job positions may have various beliefs regarding the effectiveness of an 
organization’s SRM policies, exploring these differences in perception increases our understanding of SRM 
effectiveness. Using a mixed research method approach, a combination of unstructured interviews and an existing 
SRM-based survey used in a previous study [Zafar, 2011], our study provides a richer understanding of employees’ 
perceptions toward the current SRM program at their healthcare organization. We believe this study is the first that 
explores SRM effectiveness in the context of the healthcare industry, thereby extending the body of knowledge on 
this topic. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we provide a literature review of healthcare IT security 
and critical success factors (CSFs). Next, we describe our mixed-method research design. This is followed by the 
results from both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Then, we discuss limitations, implications, and suggestions 
for future research, and finally, we conclude the article. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We looked at two previous research areas relevant to this study: Information security in healthcare and critical 
success factors. Due to a relative paucity of healthcare research in IS, we looked at some non-IS avenues as well. 
We used keywords for our search that were a blend of specific and general, such as “healthcare information 
security,” “IT security,” “healthcare security,” “healthcare IT,” “ubiquitous healthcare,” “healthcare IT breaches,” and 
“HIPAA breaches.” 
Information Security in Healthcare 
Prior researchers have equated security as being a technical, socio-philosophical [Ratnasingham, 1998] and/or a 
socio-organizational concern [Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001]. Such demarcation possibly has led to a situation in 
which security is widely regarded as a field that lacks comprehensive research in information systems [Kotulic and 
Clark, 2004; Paulson, 2002]. There is a body of work pertaining to generic healthcare IT security. For example, 
some researchers have focused on keeping information private, as regulated by legislations such as the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA, 1996], the Privacy Act of 1974 [FPA, 2007], the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITE H) Act [Blumenthal, 2010], and the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) [Grumbach and Mold, 2009]. Rindfleisch [1997] found that continued 
development of enterprise-wide IT systems in healthcare was a doubled-edged sword. On one hand, it was an 
essential development, since it provided for optimal healthcare. However, it would also inevitably lead to security 
threats such as intentional and unintentional healthcare information disclosure from insiders, as well as external 
intruders. Some have argued that legislations such as HIPAA have, in fact, created more security risks [Mercuri, 
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2004], while others have linked the importance of risk assessments to successful implementation of healthcare IT 
policies [Eloff and Eloff, 2005; Jepsen, 2003; Matuleviius, Mayer, Mouratidis, Dubois, et al., 2008]. 
 
Healthcare IT security research also has focused predominantly on the technical aspects of healthcare IT system 
implementation [Dwivedi, Bali, Belsis, Naguib, et al., 2003; Epstein, Pasieka, Lord, Wong, et al., 1998; Hu and 
Weaver, 2004; Kardas and Tunali, 2006; Ng, Sim, and Tan, 2006]. Some work also has been done in the area of 
maintenance of healthcare IT systems for security reasons. However, since healthcare IT is a relatively new area, 
most of the concerns regarding the maintenance of technologies to achieve enhanced security have been expressed 
in terms of updating healthcare security standards of applications [Kokolakis and Lambrinoudakis, 2005], employing 
new hardware and software techniques [Giakoumaki, Perakis, Tagaris, and Koutsouris, 2008], and developing new 
platforms for healthcare IT in general [Shoniregun, Dube, and Mtenzi, 2010; Su and Al-Hakim, 2010]. 
 
Healthcare IT security research also has looked at media sanitization. Media sanitization deals with disposal, 
clearing, purging, and destruction of hardware and software that contains critical data [McCallister, Glance, and 
Scarfone, 2010]. The sanitization procedures may be more complex, depending on factors such as risk to 
confidentiality and future plans for the media. Once sanitized, it is possible that hardware and software may be sold, 
given away, or discarded as provided by applicable law or regulation [McCallister et al., 2010]. 
 
Researchers also only recently have begun to focus on the requirements for disposing of healthcare IT-related 
products in a secure manner [Farzandipour, Sadoughi, Ahmadi, and Karimi, 2010; Page, 2010; Park, Seo, Son, Lee, 
et al., 2010; Smith, 2010]. This research has focused mostly on the overall nature of secure disposal of hardware 
and software. 
 
In the area of security policies, Gaunt [1998] investigated information security policy in the healthcare field and found 
the importance of the human element, especially attitude and behavior of staff and their training needs. The author 
stressed that user participation in the planning and implementation of security is important in promoting 
organizational security culture. Renaud and Goucher [2012] attempted to understand how information security 
policies impact health service employees. The authors made some suggestions to address employees’ motivational 
needs by implementing a reward system, facilitating communication and a secure organizational culture, and 
ensuring fairness in procedures. Using grounded theory, Adams and Blandford [2005] investigated how the different 
approaches to security and privacy changed users’ perceptions in two hospitals. In one hospital, user involvement in 
the development of application improved corporate awareness across the organization. In another hospital, poor 
communication from IT regarding security mechanisms was perceived by clinicians as a socially controlling force. 
Critical Success Factors (CSFs) 
Critical success factors (CSF) are “things” that must go well to ensure success for a manager or an organization 
[Rockart, 1979]. Zafar [2011] identified nine critical success factors (CSFs) for the perceived effectiveness of a SRM 
program. They are executive management support (EMS), organizational maturity (OM), open communication (OC), 
risk management stakeholders (RMS), team member empowerment (TME), holistic view for an organization (HVO), 
security maintenance (SM), corporate security strategy (CSS), and human resource development (HRD). Each of 
the CSFs in this framework is discussed next. 
 
Executive management support (EMS) refers to the role of top management in supporting the current SRM program. 
Several researchers found that top management support is the most important factor for success or in preventing 
project failures [Jarvenpaa and Ives, 1991; Martin, 1982; Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, and Cule, 2001]. If SRM is led from 
the top, organizations are better able to articulate security in terms of business value. Organizational maturity (OM) 
deals with existence of formal responsibilities and rules. Mature organizations are those in which systems are 
formalized and quantified and produce data appropriate to their decision and control processes [Ein-Dor and Segev, 
1978; Magal, Carr, and Watson, 1988; Martin, 1982]. Without this maturity, organizations may face significant 
difficulties in establishing and maintaining an effective SRM program. Open communication (OC) is defined as a 
free-flow of information within the SRM team and the stakeholders; it will not only reduce the risk of 
misunderstanding but also ensure that all the relevant stakeholders can contribute as a team. Its relation to an 
organization’s success is considerable [DeLone and McLean, 2003]. Risk management stakeholders (RMS) focuses 
on engaging a broad base of people because it can elaborate what is important to an organization [Peffers, Gengler, 
and Tuunanen, 2003]. In the case of an SRM implementation, the stakeholders include all management and staff 
since they have vested interests in the results of the SRM process and they are integral to the success of an 
organization’s IT ventures. Team member empowerment (TME) refers to the decision-making authority of 
employees; it has been explored in previous research [Al-Mashari and Zairi, 1999; Sigler and Pearson, 2000]. Most 
TME research has focused on centralized and decentralized decision structures. Their impact is varied based on 
factors such as type of organization and size of an organization. Holistic View for an Organization (HVO) pertains to 
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serves as an engine of success of an organization’s ventures and also serves as a CSF for organization-wide 
projects [Lam, 2005]. Security maintenance (SM) is defined as a set of controls and best practices that organizations 
should adopt to maintain a sufficient security standard [Dhillon, 2007]. Corporate security strategy (CSS) looks at a 
series of steps undertaken by management to either incorporate security needs or protect intellectual property rights. 
Finally, human resource development (HRD) refers to education and security training for employees [Dhillon, 2007]. 
 
Based on the above, we argue that employees’ understanding of these CSFs as they relate to SRM can maximize 
the overall effectiveness of an organizational SRM program. Thus, we will incorporate the nine CSFs in our analysis 
to investigate our research question. 
III. RESEARCH AND STATISTICAL METHOD 
We conducted a survey to assess perceived effectiveness of an SRM program at a major healthcare institution. This 
survey was part of a prior SRM-based study focused on a single Fortune 500 firm, with a future research 
recommendation that it could be applied to different organizations in different domains to ascertain external validity. 
In that study, nine critical success factors (CSFs) for the perceived effectiveness of a SRM program were identified 
[Zafar, 2011]. Zafar’s study adequately implemented guidelines that have been presented for the positivist case 
research paradigm [Lee, 1989; Yin, 1994]. These guidelines have also been successfully applied [Sarker and Lee, 
2003]. Since the survey items have been validated by Zafar [2011], there was no need for revalidation of the survey. 
Appendix A presents the survey questions, and Appendix B highlights the interview protocol. Perceived SRM 
effectiveness, which is self-reported by each participant and which deals with how secure the current SRM 
implementation is, along with nine CSFs, were included in the survey questions. 
 
We carried out onsite unstructured interviews and administered an electronic survey at a large healthcare institution 
(heretofore referred to as the Agency) in the Southeast United States. The Agency is considered one of the largest 
providers of healthcare in the United States. It was selected on the basis of its ability to represent most of what 
healthcare entails (e.g., patient care, use of IT, and a SRM program). We focused on only full-time employees who 
were either medical professionals (Ph.D.s, MDs, NPs, or RNs), or staff (mostly administrative) because we want to 
ensure that a more accurate picture of the current state of the SRM program was attained, since all full-time 
employees have gone through a mandatory HIPAA training. The survey was strictly voluntary. However, an email 
requesting participation was sent from an internal research department to all full-time employees. Some employees 
have received additional training through the Agency’s extensive crisis coordinator program. 
 
The use of a mixed research model (qualitative and quantitative research techniques) allowed us to provide a richer 
understanding in an area that to our knowledge has not been investigated in the past. This is especially relevant 
since certain results may not be explained through numbers alone. 
 
We used generalized least squares regression (GLS) to ascertain the perceived effectiveness of the SRM program 
at the Agency, which was the dependent variable and the nine CSFs were the independent variables. A dummy 
regressor was used for medical professionals (MP) and staff. 
 
Data were analyzed using two GLS models. In the first model (Equation 1), macro-level differences in perceived 
SRM effectiveness were determined. This comparison provided an abstract view of which group as a whole (MPs or 
staff) considered the CSFs more important than the other. The first model also did not take into account any 
interaction effects. The GLS equation thus was: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 1
SRM EMS OM OC RMS TME HVO
SM CSS HRD MP
      
    
       
   
                                                          (1) 
 
In (1), the dummy value MP was “1” if an employee was a medical professional, and “0” otherwise (staff). 
 
The second GLS model took into account interaction effects. In this model, the interactions of all CSFs with the 
groups were studied. The regression equation was: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 1 1
2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
*
* * * *
* * * *
SRM EMS OM OC RMS TME HVO
SM CSS HRD MP EMS MP
OM MP OC MP RMS MP TME MP
HVO MP SM MP CSS MP HRD MP
      
    
   
    
       
    
   
   
                                            (2) 
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IV. RESULTS 
This section is divided into two subsections: quantitative results and results of our unstructured interviews. 
 
Quantitative Results 
In order to gauge differences of perceptions on the SRM effectiveness between medical professionals and staff, we 
administered a multi-item questionnaire, based on the synthesized list of CSFs. At the time the survey was 
administered, the Agency had 1521 full-time employees. Overall, 1002 employees participated in the survey. Forty-
one records had to be discarded due to reasons such as incomplete information. Therefore, the total number of valid 
participants was 961 (response rate of 63.2 percent). We believe that the email request by the research department 
of the Agency was the contributing factor for this high response rate. Table 1 provides a snapshot of those who 
participated in the survey. 
 
Table 1: Survey Participants 
Gender/position MPs Staff Total 
Males 162 358 520 
Females 87 354 441 
Total 249 712 961 
 
Table 2 presents GLS estimates for the model presented in equation (1) and shows regression coefficients for each 
of the CSFs as well as the MP dummy. 
 
Table 2: MP and Staff―Without 
Interaction Effects 
 GLS (Adj. R
2
: 0.72) 
*p-value < 0.05 
Coefficients Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.87 10.12* 
EMS 0.80 9.61* 
OM 0.22 3.48* 
OC 0.20 5.86* 
RMS 0.09 5.21* 
TME -0.11 -9.11* 
HVO 0.31 8.51* 
SM 0.19 9.11* 
CSS 0.10 3.99* 
HRD 0.21 10.09* 
MP 0.14 7.65* 
 
Looking at the GLS estimates individually, we see that EMS has the highest coefficient, followed by HVO. In 
addition, the MPs had a greater positive perception of the current SRM program (a positive coefficient of MP) 
compared to staff in regard to EMS, OM, OC, RMS, HVO, SM, CSS, and HRD, since each of these CSFs indicates 
a significant positive value. This implies that employees are satisfied with how these CSFs are implemented. For 
example, a positive coefficient and a significant t value for OC imply that the employees are satisfied with the level of 
communication that in turn facilitates the SRM at the Agency. However, it is interesting to note the negative 
perception of TME in the eyes of both MPs and staff. Details on the possible reasons for this are provided in the next 
section (Qualitative Results). 
 
Table 3 presents GLS estimates for the model presented in Equation 2. Due to the modeling of interaction effects, 
please note that regression coefficients for each CSF cannot be interpreted directly. For example, the EMS 
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Table 3: MP and Staff―With 
Interaction Effects 
 GLS (Adj. R
2
: 0.71) 
*p-value < 0.05 
Coefficients Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.10 7.12* 
EMS 0.19 19.51* 
OM 0.19 9.61* 
OC 0.13 8.22* 
RMS 0.19 3.84* 
TME -0.21 -6.21* 
HVO 0.51 5.89* 
SM 0.17 2.99* 
CSS 0.10 3.13* 
HRD 0.19 7.20* 
MP 0.11 2.98* 
EMS×MP 0.14 9.69* 
OM×MP 0.13 4.11* 
OC×MP 0.13 3.09* 
RMS×MP 0.22 3.13* 
TME×MP -0.10 -3.19* 
HVO×MP 0.37 3.28* 
SM×MP 0.19 4.19* 
CSS×MP 0.10 3.70* 
HRD×MP 0.10 3.10* 
 
The coefficients presented in Table 3 also reflect results similar to Table 2. For example, even when taking into 
account interaction effects, medical professionals (MP) had a positive perception of SRM effectiveness on all CSFs 
except for TME, since the coefficient on MP is positive and all CSFs but TME indicated positive coefficients and 
significant t values in Table 3. 
Qualitative Results 
Unstructured interviews were carried out with employees in various units of the Agency. These interviews occurred 
after completion of the surveys. Five employees (four men and one woman) from the information security division 
participated in the interviews. We were also able to interview three more employees (two MPs and one 
administrative assistant). The purpose was to get their perspective on not only our preliminary results, but also to get 
their insights on the current SRM process at the Agency. One of the common themes in our conversation with the 
security division’s employees was that the Agency focused heavily on how device manufacturers need to manage 
security risks pertaining to healthcare systems. The division carries out detailed security risk assessments in the 
context of security risk management on a quarterly basis. The prime IT security risks, according to them, were risks 
to data and systems. Also, as a healthcare institution, the Agency has to integrate IT security risk management and 
patient safety risk management. These two issues are closely intertwined in the area of ubiquitous healthcare. 
 
The employees also discussed how ubiquitous healthcare entails a paradigm shift in healthcare practice, delivery, 
and view. It focuses on patient-centric operational models promoting real-time monitoring of patients’ medical 
progress, compliance to physicians’ advice (such as taking prescription drugs as and when required), and prompt 
detection of anomalies without time and location dependencies. The fundamental process of ubiquitous healthcare 
involves the sensing of patient specific information (vital signs, drug compliance, etc.), analysis of collected 
information for detection of anomalies, and communication of pertinent information to healthcare stakeholders 
(doctors/nurses/relevant family members) as required. According to them, use of ubiquitous devices can lead to 
potential IT security-related issues. 
 
Security risk management at the Agency includes scoring of risks, proposing and implementing mitigations for 
vulnerabilities, summarization of residual risks, collecting security related requirements for the assets, and listing the 
information assets that need to be protected and understanding their intended use. 
 
Risk assessments include the ability of the Agency’s departments to mitigate and have operational workarounds for 
scenarios such as discontinuity of typical IT services (e.g., network addressing and user authentication) of critical 
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laboratories on site. Other scenarios include natural disasters, malicious attack on the IT infrastructure, and insider 
threats. 
 
When we presented the results of our survey and alluded to the negative perceptions of the employees in regard to 
TME, the interviewees were not surprised. According to them, there is limited authority on the part of a regular 
medical professional or a staff employee outside their division. Though the Agency has developed a process where 
any employee may route a new vulnerability to the security division, overall, all security-related matters are the 
exclusive authority of the division. According to one employee, this ensures centralization of decisions that may 
impact records management. The employee further stated that “[v]ital records management is an essential tool in 
our arsenal. We have a records manager who plays a crucial role in the identification, inventory, protection, storage, 
and accessibility of vital records that support essential functions.” This, according to the employees, may be the 
reason why anyone outside the division may have a negative perception of Team Member Empowerment (TME). 
According to another security employee, the security office is trying to remove the negative perception. The 
employee stated that “[w]e are planning to establish a Cyber Security Working Group to share best practices and 
better prepare and plan for performance of essential functions during potential disruptions.” The working group 
would include a sampling of employees across all the Agency’s units, including external partners, such as suppliers 
and vendors. As far as the other eight factors go, they are a part of a massive security awareness program that the 
security division sponsors. Also, all employees are required to go through Agency-specific IT security-related training 
every two years. An employee told us that in “60% of the training sessions, [the] focus is on phishing and internal 
threats faced. We provide them with hypothetical scenario and try to educate them accordingly.” This is in addition to 
any guidelines laid down by the state and the federal governments. 
 
The interesting thing about the negative perception of TME was that the medical professionals and staff still 
supported the current status quo. One of the two medical professionals mentioned that, “[a]s an ICU unit chief, I 
need to make split-second decisions for numerous patients, which impacts them and their families. I do not have 
time to worry about IT security. There are people here who deal with that.” Another MP noted, “[i]n the ER the last 
thing on my mind is IT security. My attending will judge my medical skills. Paperwork outside of that is not on my 
mind.” Similarly, an administrative assistant reflected, “[o]ur doctors have enough paperwork work to deal with. For 
them it is better to delegate nonmedical related decisions such as IT security.” Based on our observations, the MPs 
considered delegation as a routine matter, with the assumption that the delegated authority had the capacity to 
accomplish the task. Although medical professionals have their concern for patients and motivations to complete 
their task efficiently and effectively, it is important to note that their personal motivations might conflict with overall 
organizational information security―as indicated by some medical professionals, that IT security is viewed as a 
nonmedical issue. 
V. LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study is not without its potential weaknesses. While this case study research provided rich data from both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects, the findings of the single case study limits the generalizability of results. Future 
research is needed to assess the generalizability of our findings by replicating our study in different organizational 
settings. Another limitation of the study is the sample size of the interviews. Compared to survey data that we 
collected for the quantitative section of our research, we could collect a total of only eight interviews for the 
qualitative part. However, these interviewees, MPs (attending physicians and residents) (PGY2 or PGY3 Internal 
Medicine, or PGY2, PGY3, or PGY4 Combined Med-Peds), PGY1 residents (Internal Medicine, Combined Med-
Peds, or Transitional Year) understandably lead a very busy work schedule. As researchers we wanted to make 
sure that we did not take our access for granted or hinder their work in any way. Even with limited interviews, we 
believe we were able to get valuable insights of people of different backgrounds at the Agency. 
 
This research contributes to the extant literature on SRM by providing additional insights on employees ’ perceptions 
toward the SRM program. In addition, this study offers a richer understanding of this research topic in the context of 
a healthcare organization. 
 
This research also has some practical implications for managers. This study presents an overview of how 
employees in the same organization with similar training can have opposing points of view pertaining to perceptions 
of a SRM implementation. Thus, this study raises some concerns whether the SRM training at the Agency is 
effective, and whether it might be necessary to take some steps to measure employees’ understanding of security 
issues and policies after the training event, perhaps using quizzes or surveys. Previous studies also suggested that 
we should focus less on formal procedures but focus more on employees when implementing SRM [Lacey, 2010]. 
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When it comes to healthcare IT security issues in general, the inherent security threats and risks associated with 
healthcare are yet to be fully resolved, despite the known benefits of ubiquitous computing. These were mentioned 
in the interview sessions. The enhanced functionalities afforded by the enabling technologies brings increased 
challenges with respect to data storage, distribution, connectivity, computational power, and energy budgets [Liu, 
Clark, and Stepney, 2005]. Dealing ethically with critical patient information derived from biometric sensors and 
mobile devices require systems not only to be reliable and scalable but also to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, 
and privacy of sensitive health data. Cisco, in its 2010 annual report, predicted that attackers increasingly would 
target mobile devices as they make their way onto enterprise networks [Cisco, 2011]. This prediction was not too 
dissimilar from earlier ones [Leavitt, 2005]. The reason the landscape did not change appreciably before was that 
mobile devices were not attractive and/or lucrative targets for attackers, due to the heterogeneous nature of the 
technologies involved. Malware development for a single platform did not result in a high number of victims, and 
altering malware for use on multiple platforms was not as cost effective. However, as mobile devices become 
homogenous in terms of operating system usage and the backbone networking technologies [Ahmed, Jamal, 
Mehboob, Khan, et al., 2010], with popular and full-featured SDK APIs, creation of malware will become 
comparatively trivial, thereby leading to information security concerns. Besides, it is to be noted that wireless 
communication channels suffer from spotty coverage and are not 100 percent reliable [Sneha and Varshney, 2009]. 
The sole reliance of ubiquitous healthcare information systems on wireless channels for data communication/ 
transfer provides further opportunities to malicious agents [Liu et al., 2005]. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we explored the perceived effectiveness of a security risk management (SRM) program at a healthcare 
organization. To our knowledge, this is the first study that used a mixed research case-based approach addressing 
the SRM aspect in the healthcare industry. 
 
Although SRM programs are implemented to maintain information security in an organization, unless employees at 
all levels are committed and aware of the SRM policies, the SRM program may not be as effective as it should be, 
especially for the healthcare organization where risk is inherent in delivering such healthcare. 
 
Our study provides valuable insights on how employees perceive their current SRM program at the organization. 
Using nine CSFs―executive management support (EMS), organizational maturity (OM), open communication (OC), 
risk management stakeholders (RMS), team member empowerment (TME), holistic view for an organization (HVO), 
security maintenance (SM), corporate security strategy (CSS), and human resource development (HRD), we were 
able to gauge the effectiveness of the SRM program at the healthcare organization. We found that employees 
perceived SRM program at the agency as very effective, based on all CSFs except team member empowerment 
(TME). Both interaction and no interaction effects indicated that perception of employees toward TME was negative. 
This is an interesting finding of our study. Although it needs to be investigated further, our study has practical 
implications for managers, as discussed in the earlier section. 
 
With a rise in the use of sophisticated technology in healthcare, there are more risks than an organization can 
effectively mitigate without a formal SRM program. Therefore, it is imperative that an effective SRM program is in 
place in a healthcare organization. Information security has been studied in IS. However, the context has been e-
commerce and, at best, has been minimally researched [Sharma and Sugumaran, 2011]. While our study 
contributes to SRM research, there is a need for future research to focus on a holistic approach toward information 
security incorporating dimensions such as people, technology, and organization. 
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The following questionnaire was used. It has been adapted in its entirety from Zafar [2011]. 
SRM Effectiveness (SRM) 
1) Relative to our type of industry, security is very effective at this location. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2) Our security policy is understood by management. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3) Our security policy is understood by end users (e.g., staff). 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4) Internal operations that rely on accurate and timely data information have not been negatively impacted by 
security measures. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5) We have protective security measures in place that are cost-effective and have reduced the level of risk to 
acceptable levels. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Executive Management Support (EMS) 
 
6) Senior management has fully supported the establishment of plans, policies, programs, and guidelines for 
information security. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7) The information security function is supported with appropriate resources to perform its function in system design, 
test, and evaluation. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8) Senior management takes an active role in development and implementation of security controls. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
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Organizational Maturity (OM) 
 
9) The organization has a formal program of roles and responsibilities that are known to everyone. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
10) The current security awareness program effort was in reaction in large part to actual or suspected past instances 
of security breaches at this location. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
11) We use audit reviews to evaluate the levels of risk in order to identify levels that exceed acceptable limits 
established by management. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Open Communication (OC) 
12) When a formal security policy initiative is launched, visibility is given to the event through devices such as 
management presentations and question/answer forums. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
13) Management communicates visibly and seriously regarding the need to protect the confidentiality of sensitive 
information. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Risk Management Stakeholders (RMS) 
 
14) The current security policy is the result of inputs from many members of our organization. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
15) Auditors and security personnel are involved in design changes in information systems. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Team Member Empowerment (TME) 
 
16) Getting authorization to access data that would be useful in my function is time-consuming and difficult. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
17) Data that would be useful to my function is unavailable because we do not have the right authorization. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
18) The decentralized organization of the unit’s Information Security Services with respect to personnel who carry 
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Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
19) The decentralized organization of the unit’s Information Security Services with respect to securing hardware and 
software is beneficial. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Holistic View of an Organization (HVO) 
 
20) The organization’s business objectives and goals include compliance with a broad-level security policy. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
21) There is strong insistence on a uniform managerial style throughout the organization. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Security Maintenance (SM) 
 
22) The role-based access control procedures offered are sufficient. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
23) The organization takes adequate steps in updating the SRM policy. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Corporate Security Strategy (CSS) 
 
24) The organization provides adequate support for the intellectual property rights issues associated with in-house 
security solutions (e.g., patent support, etc.). 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
25) The organization supports development of in-house security software. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Human Resource Development (HRD) 
 
26) The organization offers sufficient security training to members who are directly involved with the security risk 
management process. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
27) Personnel responsible for executing the security risk management process have sufficient experience to deal 
with security related incidents. 
 
Not at all    To a large extent 
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APPENDIX B 
This section highlights the unstructured interview protocol. 
 
Pre-Interview 
- Introduce researcher to the participant and briefly mention the purpose of the study. 
- Present Informed Consent Form. 
 
Interview 
- Conduct an unstructured interview with each participant. Mention to the participant that his/her responses 
will be recorded. 
- Start with an open-ended question about their current position and how the SRM program pertains to them. 
- Ask an open-ended question about any situations when SRM hindered their work. Bring up TME. 
- Debrief participants about how the interview responses will be used. 
 
Post-Interview 
- Create codes and secure all data. 
- Summarize some of the memorable things the participant said at different moments. 
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